Note from Maung Zarni
A dialogue on local administrative structures. Many of today’s nation-states clustered around the United Nations, the post-World War II system of states, are largely a key outcome of colonial empires. As such many of them inherited the pathological & farcical notions of racial/ethnic and religious supremacy of the dominant group that have taken control of the reins of these political organisations. Within these webs of power-administrative entities, certain identity-based populations have been rendered “minorities” in their own ancestral land with no “hard borders” by the typically ethno and religious supremacist states. For instance, Israel is an extreme case wherein the ancestrally and historically majority population of multi-faith Arab and other native communities have been classed as “minorities” by the European Jews, who have essentially grabbed vast territories of native land, using a mix of messianic biblical fairy tales, UN-mandate and brute force supported unconditionally by successive imperialist Anglo-American powers. With the US-Turkey-US-induced collapse of the Russian-backed Assad dynasty of 50 years in Damascus, Syria is now undergoing a painful process of restructuring its internal power arrangements among different identity-based populations. FORSEA’s Board director, retired professor of law Gill Boehringer of Australia, presents his dialogue with a Kurdish scholar and revolutionary involved in the creation of alternative, community-based administration and justice system in an autonomous Kurdish region. Kurds as a people have been dismembered and swallowed up as “minorities” in the UN-recognized full sovereign states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Although the dialogue was conducted a while ago, its depth, richness and breath make it all the more relevant to the new administrative formations vis-a-vis racist and religious supremacist states that have not really advanced the welfare of “minority” populations.
A dialogue on local administrative structures. Many of today’s nation-states clustered around the United Nations, the post-World War II system of states, are largely a key outcome of colonial empires. As such many of them inherited the pathological & farcical notions of racial/ethnic and religious supremacy of the dominant group that have taken control of the reins of these political organisations. Within these webs of power-administrative entities, certain identity-based populations have been rendered “minorities” in their own ancestral land with no “hard borders” by the typically ethno and religious supremacist states. For instance, Israel is an extreme case wherein the ancestrally and historically majority population of multi-faith Arab and other native communities have been classed as “minorities” by the European Jews, who have essentially grabbed vast territories of native land, using a mix of messianic biblical fairy tales, UN-mandate and brute force supported unconditionally by successive imperialist Anglo-American powers. With the US-Turkey-US-induced collapse of the Russian-backed Assad dynasty of 50 years in Damascus, Syria is now undergoing a painful process of restructuring its internal power arrangements among different identity-based populations. FORSEA’s Board director, retired professor of law Gill Boehringer of Australia, presents his dialogue with a Kurdish scholar and revolutionary involved in the creation of alternative, community-based administration and justice system in an autonomous Kurdish region. Kurds as a people have been dismembered and swallowed up as “minorities” in the UN-recognized full sovereign states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Although the dialogue was conducted a while ago, its depth, richness and breath make it all the more relevant to the new administrative formations vis-a-vis racist and religious supremacist states that have not really advanced the welfare of “minority” populations.
Gill H. Boehringer
Gill H. Boehringer
Hon. Prof. and former Dean
Macquarie University Law School, Sydney, Australia
The following are the notes of a discussion between Professor Gill H. Boehringer and two persons, SD and FV, who are familiar with the system being developed by Kurdish communities within the framework of their program of “democratic confederalism”. The essence of that program is to build an egalitarian society from the bottom up, one committed to mass participation, joined with similar communities in a federal system across a region where there are many Kurdish communities.
Because of the perilous situation for Kurds and others in Turkey who are not aligned with the Erdogan regime, I have assigned initials to my two informants, and have not included any personal details of their lives to protect them from any harm from the government. I have not disclosed the location of our discussions which took place in 2013.
Notes were taken of the discussion by Prof. Boehringer (GB) and SD.
FV spoke in Turkish, translated by SD.
The background to the Interview
I had learned of the “autonomy project” of the Kurdish people in southeastern Turkey, or North Kurdistan. It had been discussed by Dr. Anna Kowarsch in a paper presented to the International Conference for Human Rights and Peace (ICHERP) in Manila, Philippines in July 2013. Dr. Kowarsch had discussed the concept of Kurdish autonomy and the evolving practice of “democratic confederalism”, arising out of the Kurdish desire to find justice in a nation state heretofore dominated by a highly centralized Turkish state.
Historically the Turks had not recognized Kurdish language and culture, and the Turkish army had carried out devastating punitive raids in Kurdish territory, including the infamous Derzim massacre in 1938. With a powerful guerrilla force, the Kurds had fought the Turkish army to a standstill, and a cease fire allowed for Kurdish autonomy plans to commence implementation. (The “autonomy project” is described in the publication “Democratic Society Party’s Project of Democratic Solution to the Kurdish Question” (in Kurdish, Turkish and English), 2008).
Of particular interest for me was the development of an alternative justice system operating outside the legal jurisdiction of the Turkish state. I had worked on such an enterprise with Sinn Fein and local community groups in Belfast and Derry City, Northern Ireland in the mid-1970s, and had retained an interest in such developments in other parts of the world.
I also had contact with Kurdish lawyers in Western Europe including a lawyer in the Netherlands and a member of the Executive Committee of the International Association of Peoples’ Lawyers, and was familiar in general with the Kurds’ struggle for their rights in Turkey. From the IAPL lawyers I had obtained a copy of the pamphlet “Who Is Abdullah Ocala?” which briefly details the history of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and its struggle, first politically then militarily, for the rights of Kurds and other minorities within the Turkish national sate.
At the time of my trip to Turkey I was working on the possible development of Local Peoples’ Tribunals (LPTs), influenced in large part by my experience with the Permanent Peoples Tribunals held in Cambodia (on the situation of garment workers) and in Mexico (on aspects of the comprehensive social crisis in that country). Some of the basic concepts in the LPTs project are similar to those of the Kurds alternative justice system discussed in the meeting with SD and FV.1
DISCUSSION
GB: Tell me about the concepts which are basic to your program.
FV: The most important place to start is with our understanding of a system of law. It must be based on ethical principles, upon moral standards. It must be a system of justice, not simply legal rules. Our system is committed above all to achieving justice, rather than a commitment to imposing formal legal rules.
Second, we believe that such a system, providing justice for the ordinary people, must be close to the people. Law cannot be separated from the society it functions in. This is the problem with state law, at least in Turkey. Therefore, it must be operated by the people themselves. We want to develop our system with two important elements: 1) it must be de-centralized; and 2) it must be de-professionalized.
SD: Yes, we sum it up by saying that our system is 1) anti-state; 2) anti-hierarchic; 3) anti-hegemonic. We do not recognize the state’s universalist claim to represent our interests and to apply its law to us. The historic role of the national state, was to universalize its domination and therefore to destroy differences in the cultures and traditions of minority groups within its national boundaries. We can see this happened after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The Kurdish experience of that “nation building” experience has been disastrous.
We reject the hierarchal architecture of the state system which emphasizes the privileges an elite will have in a national state legal system, denying meaningful participation to the ordinary citizens.
Anti-hegemonic refers to our refusal to accept any attempt to organize the administration of justice so that one set of state laws applied by “experts”-the legal profession- will be imposed on communities who wish to live according to their own ideas of justice.
GB: How did you arrive at this understanding of law and the need to develop an alternative justice system?
FV: It came from our experience and understanding of the Turkish state and its formal legal system.
First, the Turkish state has not provided us with justice. There has been comprehensive discrimination against us including an historical ban on our language and culture, as well as barriers to education and political participation, even though we are nearly one-third of the population in this country (about 20 million out of 75 million-and the same goes for the other minorities which make up perhaps another 5 million).
Indeed, you must remember that after World War I the Kurds of the Middle East and Turkey were denied our own territory even though we were, and still are, a much larger population (about 40 million minimum) than many European countries which have their own state. ( GB: And a population bigger than Australia, at about 22 million). Yet countries such as Lichtenstein, Andorra, and San Marino have less than a million between them.
Second, the state legal system is not just a neutral institution for regulating the disputes between people. It has been a significant part of the system of repression and exploitation of our people. It has been biased against us. As in other countries historically, much of the human rights abuse we have suffered has been legitimated by legislation and upheld by the courts.
GB: We have a saying for that. The abuse and discrimination is done “under color of law” and is thus legitimated for those who wish to see it as “lawful”.
FV: That is what is done here by the state. It allows them to try to justify their harsh and unjust rule by pointing to the so-called legality of what they are doing. So we do not look to the legal system for assistance in our struggle for our rights and equality with the other peoples in Turkey.
Of course it must be understood that we are not the only ones who are treated in a discriminatory fashion, so we support other communities in their demands for justice. Our fight is for equal rights for all under a Turkish “confederation”, not just for the Kurds.
Third, the Turkish state is extremely highly centralized. We see this as an impediment to authentic citizen participation in the political processes, including law. We believe in de-centralization. In fact this is a part of our culture. The Kurds have never been a “state” orientated people. Our tribes, our local communities have always been the focus of political and social processes, including law.
Fourth, it is also a practical matter: legal cases in Turkey are not dealt with expeditiously. They drag along seemingly endlessly. And of course, for Kurds and others, there is a justifiable belief that the decisions are not always just.
Fifth, it should be pointed out that in addition to the above, there is the blatant abuse suffered by our Kurdish lawyers. At this moment there are 36 of them in prison. Their crime? They are accused of supporting the armed struggle of the Kurdish people, through the PKK guerrilla army. But what those imprisoned lawyers have tried to do is protect the rights of people who are rounded up, thrown in prison and treated very badly. That is, for doing your professional duty as a lawyer, in Turkey if you are a Kurd you can get thrown in prison. At one point all the lawyers who were defending our leader Abdullah Ocalan were imprisoned. Just for being his lawyers.
GB: That is interesting, and parallels the experience of the members of the Peoples’ Lawyers Office- Halkin Hukuk Burosu (HHB) I have just had discussions with in Istanbul. They are a very progressive group – living and working communally – and giving legal support to the poor and minorities. But at the moment, nine of the 12 lawyers in their collective are in prison, awaiting trial on what will be charges of, essentially, subversion.
FV: Yes, anyone who fights for democracy and justice in Turkey is likely to have that kind of serious trouble with the state. Defense of Kurds, and in this instance of the rights of our leader, Abdullah Ocalan, are for the Turkish state a form of terrorism.
GB: Can you tell me a bit more about the content or substantive foundation of your justice system?
FV: That is a question we have been faced with all along, and the answer is somewhat complex. In part we rely on the traditional ways of the Kurdish people. What we might call the values by which we have always tried to live as Kurds. I might say, in a sense, the “natural law” of the Kurds. Of course we need to find a modern version of this. We, that is the BDP, have recently established a Theoretical Foundation to look at that issue, amongst others.
GB: To what extent does Islam figure in this?
FV: Of course Islam has been part of our culture for more than a thousand years. So just as Christianity is the fountain from which flows much of the understanding in the West of “right living”, so too has Islam had a fundamental impact on our thinking about social relations and justice between members of our society.
GB: Does that mean Shari’a law is at the basis of the new system you are developing?
FV: No. Islam has been important as a religious philosophy if you will. But we reject the idea of strict legal rules as in Shari’a. We wish to create an alternative set of institutions and also an alternative set of practices and standards which will be used to bring justice to the people. Justice which will be legitimate to the people because they have created it.
GB: In the common law culture we draw a distinction between applying strictly formal state law-or as it is called “positive law”-and the use of interpretation to allow some discretion, often common sense, to reach an appropriate decision in a case. It is therefore a somewhat flexible application of legal rules. We refer to the positive law written in the legislation, or even that which evolves from our cases, as “black letter law”. Since it is necessarily general and abstract, it is often difficult to apply it in specific cases with their own, often complicated and unanticipated facts. So a degree of discretion, or subjectivity, is called for to reach a fair and just decision.
FV: Yes, that is what we would recognize as an appropriate way of dealing with a case before a court. But our situation is different again. We wish to keep cases out of the courts. We wish to develop a consciousness in our people that matters can be settled without courts and lawyers and rigid laws-your “black-letter laws”. We believe that what is just is the important result for a dispute, not whether it has been “decided” by a state court according to the law imposed by the state.
How to reach a just conclusion to a dispute? We believe that the parties involved, probably much of the time two-or more-families, should come together and discuss the matter, leading to a settlement of the case on a basis which each party can accept as a just result.
GB: Does that work in practice?
FV: People by the thousands have gone through the process, so they must see it as an effective and legitimate method of resolving their disputes.
GB: Can you say a bit more about how the process works?
FV: The first thing we require is that the parties agree that the process which they are about to enter is legitimate. The other requirement is that they agree to abide by the settlement which is reached.
GB: When you say “we” to whom are you referring?
FV: That is the Legal Commission of the BDP, and the people who are designated to deal with the disputes.
GB: So the people in your communities have to approach the party or its Legal Commission in order to have a dispute dealt with?
FV: Yes. Our party has very strong support throughout the Kurdish territories. This has been demonstrated in elections and in other ways. There is trust for the party. The people have experience of our party’s work on their behalf and consider it the peoples’ party. The Turkish state also understands the role of the party, although in contradictory fashion.
GB: What do you mean by that?
FV: While we are a legitimate party and have representation in the parliament (the Grand National Assembly), and in regional and local, elected, public offices the state does not hesitate to put our parliamentary and other representatives (e.g. Mayors of cities and towns) in prison. And we have from time to time been banned. But we then change the name and become “lawful” once again.
GB: Has that happened often?
FV: Yes, this is the 7th name our party has had in the past decades.
GB: Just a side point. I believe there is an institution called the Peoples’ Small National Assembly. Can you tell me about that?
FV: Yes, that is an interesting development. We support it and play a part in its activities. Essentially it is an alternative alliance of civil society groups, political oppositionists including parties, and NGOs. It produces alternative policies and an agenda for reform.
There is also a Kurdish National Congress (KCK) which is “international” in that it represents the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Although the Iraqi situation is quite different as there the Kurds have a special “autonomous” region as a part of a federal Iraqi system.
GB: The Peoples’ assembly is a useful way of presenting options to the people in the normal political process. I suppose the nearest thing we have in Australia is a “shadow cabinet” which operates to give voice to the criticism of the Government and also to publicize the policies and programs of the Opposition.
FV: Similar. But the Small National Assembly is outside the framework of formal political institutions. In a sense, your Opposition is a part of that framework.
GB: Indeed. We sometimes speak of the two (or sometimes three) main parties (or alliances) as “two wings of the same bird”. I suspect your Small National Assembly has more room for radical policy formulation than our conservative Opposition parties.
FV: I cannot comment about your system, except on the basis of our general principles-political participation is fundamental for real democracy, and we as a party maintain close contact with our people, although in the present circumstances we take part in the centralized national political process, In the long term, we seek to develop an alternative to institutionalized, centralized parties which are inevitably separated from the people and subject to a “law” of bureaucratization. And they are often corrupt.
GB: That sounds like an apt description of the Australian Labor Party, and the voters are turning their backs on it. Let us return to our discussion of your justice system. We were talking about the procedures in getting disputes resolved. It is sometimes said by common lawyers that procedure is the most important part of the law. Without proper procedures-what we call “due process”- the rights one has can easily be trampled on.
FV: Yes we are aware of the importance of proper procedures. That is an issue we have tried to be very careful about. We want the system to bring justice and to be seen to be legitimate. Without procedures protecting those who come before our commissions we could lose the confidence of the people. And as you suggest, justice would escape us.
GB: We have a saying– ‘the law must not only be just, but be seen to be just.” Of course, much of the time it is not just-but the hegemonic power of our judicial systems often allows it to escape scrutiny for its injustice.
SD: It would be hard for our local commissions to escape such scrutiny as we are working with the people in their communities.
GB: Historically jurisdiction, at least in the common law system, was said to be based on the ability-or power- of the court to bring a person before the court; and then to enforce its decision, thus emphasizing its authority. Would you comment on that with regard to your system?
FV: You must understand that we cannot force people to come to us, or to engage in our processes. Nor should we try to force them to do so. But tens of thousands have done so. The system has been evolving for decades, and is generally accepted because it is striving for justice, developing and not rigid. That more and more people are coming to us suggests acceptance and legitimacy. But of course there may be those who, for various reasons, may not wish to take advantage of what is made available for them. That is a decision they are free to make.
GB: What about enforcement of the settlement/agreement, or even a decision by the Commission?
FV: That is an important and complex matter. But put simply, we do not try to enforce the decisions agreed to. The parties should, and do, agree to follow what has been settled. Should they not, we as a Commission take no further action. But that does not mean the party which does not accept the result of the process has nothing to worry about. After all, they are a part of the community. If the community believes they are wrong in their refusal, then they will not wish to associate with them, or perhaps just not speak to them.
GB: We use the expression “sending them to Coventry”. It can be an effective sanction in small communities.
FV: That has been our experience.
GB: Why might a party to the dispute believe the decision ought not to be followed?
FV: One of the reasons might be because they believe that the settlement of the case is based on subjective ideas about the matter, or what is an inappropriate sanction, or punishment.
GB: Ah, now we are opening a can of worms. This part of the procedure is always difficult for courts and parties, and it is interesting to learn how this is dealt with in an alternative system.
FV: Let us take, for example, a criminal case which has been brought to us. One of the basic aims of achieving agreements is to have the dispute settled so that there would not be a “blood” retaliation by aperson or family which has suffered injury at the hands of another.
It could be a robbery or even a murder alleged against a person. In working towards a resolution of the case, after hearing the evidence, the local panel will discuss its proposed terms for a settlement for the parties to consider.
In formulating the proposed resolution of the case, our people take into account the ethical standards and other sources of norms and values about which we spoke previously. But they also consider the expectations of the victim. Here there is indeed some degree of subjectivity.
The perpetrator may believe the panel has gotten it wrong. We try to work out an agreement, which may mean modifying the terms of the proposed settlement or the decision of the Commission. However this may still leave the perpetrator or the victim’s family unhappy.
GB: Could one of the reasons be that the Commission was corrupt or in some way biased against the perpetrator or even the victim?
FV: That has not arisen so far. Our people are respected members of the community and it would be surprising if such claims were made. But of course there is always a first time. We would have to consider the matter seriously.
GB: Could a party to a dispute object to a member of the Commission or others involved in facilitating the resolution of the dispute?
FV: Yes, that is a right which we always allow to the parties. If they are not happy with the people involved, then we will replace them.
GB: I would imagine that there could be a difference in the urban and rural settings, as in the latter everyone is likely to know or be aware of the reputation and even the behaviour and attributes of your people; however, in a large city that would probably not be the case.
FV: Yes, that is possibly a difference which could impact on our system. But so far we have not seen great differences. Even in the cities we work at the local level, and people still are aware of the reputations of the people we designate-with their approval-to facilitate or decide a matter.
SD:I think the degree of individualism and isolation you have in the cities in the West have not thoroughly permeated our Kurdish communities. With the further impact of consumerist ideologies, or more broadly the impact of neo-liberalism with its emphasis on the market and de-emphasis of communal values and traditions, there could be problems we will have to consider, especially as you suggest, in the cities where many Kurds have sought refuge after the Turkish state destroyed about 5000 Kurdish villages as part of its “anti-terrorism” program.
GB: You have spoken about the evolution of your system. Can you say something about that?
FV: The emergence of the whole “autonomy project” came out of the struggles waged politically and militarily by the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s. The treatment of our people by the Turkish state, heightened by the military coup in 1980, was very harsh. The prison in Diyarbakir, the main Kurdish city, became notorious for the torture and killings suffered by Kurds within its walls. It was rated as one of the worst 10 prisons in the world.
SD: Our side has constantly tried to negotiate matters with the Turkish state. The PKK is now known as a guerrilla army, but it started out as a political organisation seeking to work for a just future for the Kurds and others within Turkey. But the Turkish governments have generally refused to discuss our fundamental grievances seriously and consistently.
FV: Our long struggle for human rights and against discrimination and repression led us to re-think our view of the future and how we saw a real democracy working. It required decentralisation. But in the 1980s and 90s with violent armed clashes continuing as the state forces aimed to destroy our movement, it was impossible to implement our schema. So we have moved through several stages.
The first stage was what we can call the survival stage. There was a great deal of pressure from the military forces of the Turkish state. It was a very difficult time for our people, and there was no opportunity to develop the system as we wanted to; and certainly impossible to institutionalize anything as the conditions of war meant that everything was pretty much ad hoc and considered to be temporary.
GB: Understandably! Perhaps it was not entirely negative. It gave you time to develop your thinking and also made you realize what a very difficult task you were confronting. And to see some things which you would not want to incorporate into your system in peace time.
FV: I think that is the view of most of our people. What the PKK implemented was an alternative system, but it was hierarchal and not greatly de-centralized. There was a focus on “crime”-both crimes against the people; and crimes against the PKK. And the philosophy was punitive: an eye for an eye might best describe it.
SD: Our present view of crime and the state’s view are quite different. The latter actually “causes” crime. Define the crime, you create the crime, and thereby create the criminal, and a bureaucracy of the judiciary and related institutions and agencies.
That is, the state designates through its law certain behaviour as criminal. It then arrests persons for committing such behaviour. After that, they put the violator-the “criminal”- through a series of processes which confirms that criminal status. And then they punish the “criminal” with prison, which as we know is very unlikely to make the person a better citizen. In fact, it is likely to make him just what the state has said: a criminal.
GB: That is very reminiscent of the critique of state policy and practice which emerged some years ago in Western critical criminology, called the labelling or “societal reaction” perspectives. So what is your approach?
SD: We try to place what has happened in context, and ask the parties-say a victim and a perpetrator- to try to work out an agreement which will acknowledge past wrong-doing, but look forward to a positive outcome for all, the parties and the community. An outcome which is just and humane. Thus we believe community service is a far better sanction than incarceration.
GB: I am reminded of our experience in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. Although we had a similar vision of an alternative system, we also were in a period of intense guerrilla warfare, much of it in Derry City and Belfast where I was involved. Perhaps inevitably, the processes were also dominated by the armed men of the IRA, and its close supporters in each community. The sanctions applied against perpetrators were unsophisticated and punitive, e.g. “kneecapping” which was the shooting in the leg; or “tar-and-feathering” a painful and crude, traditional Irish punishment for serious offenses against the community.
Later the military struggle was balanced by more political work in the communities. The IRA, which said it did not wish to be a police force, encouraged the development of community based policing, community courts and local Peoples’ Assemblies to be responsible for policies and practices of the community, including the peoples’ institutions and their activities. Community service was one of the ideas which emerged for ordinary crimes, and exile for serious crimes such as drug dealing which was having a bad effect on the communities as well as being a threat to the security of the guerrillas (perpetrators were put on the boat to England or Scotland and told not to return).
FV: That is an interesting parallel, and emphasizes the relation between the particular circumstances of society and the nature of the alternatives which are seen to be available. In our situation, a second stage came when, in the past decade, the warfare was relatively restricted and the Turkish state- led by some of its leading military people-decided that the war with the PKK could not be won militarily. Although its commitment to a peace process seems to come and go.
In the relative peace and calm which followed the earlier period of sustained fighting, we have been able to move forward to a structure and processes which are more compatible with our vision of an alternative system. The political party began to organise the justice system in the local communities, so that de-centralization was a fact, as was de-professionalization. By allowing local disputes to be resolved locally and by the parties to the dispute (facilitated by representatives of the Party) we also brought about a process which de-emphasized hierarchy.
It was in this second stage that civil cases became a very large part of the work dealt with by our system. Family matters, land disputes, and others of a civil nature, became the most important part of our work.
In the third stage, the party established its Legal Commission, and has recently supplemented it with a Theoretical Foundation which will study the issues we face and help to guide us in the evolution of our policies and practices. Thus far, we have not really institutionalised the system so there is room for new ideas to be experimented with and, if successful, implemented. We also hope to learn from the experience of others in similar situations.
GB: Tell me more about how the Commission fits in to this system.
FV: The Commission has an important place in the system. It fulfils a number of roles. I have mentioned its supervisory role previously. It also has an administrative role. That is, people approach it at the local level with a dispute, it then organizes the processing of the dispute by getting the parties together.
It also has an “adjudicative” role. For example, if two parties find that after some time discussing their dispute and the proposals and counter-proposals which they have made, they cannot agree, then it can be left to the Commission to resolve the matter. It may facilitate further discussions, offer proposals for a settlement, or in the end it may have to decide the terms and conditions of the settlement.
GB: How is the local commission brought into being?
FV: These local bodies are not institutionalized. They are ad hoc, and emerge in the local area as and when needed.
GB: Who are they?
FV: They can be anyone who is acceptable to the parties and who has respect in the community.
SD: We work with the local community, including civil society groups and appropriate NGOs which may be in the local area. In this way we get volunteers who are generally known and respected for their dedication to justice in the community.
GB: Are they paid or are they strictly volunteers?
FV: They are all volunteers.
GB: Have you had trouble in getting volunteers for this task?
FV: No. We always have more volunteers than we need.
GB: This would seem to be another testimonial to the support for the system. I think that if the system was not thought by the people to be legitimate, people would be reluctant to be associated with it.
FV: That is what we believe. Thousands have used our system or that which is working in several other parts of our territory. For example, in Suriya (Syria, in the north of which the Kurds have established “West Kurdistan” along the Turkey and Iraq borders) an allied Party operates an alternative system, but they have a somewhat different approach, more institutionalized and a bit closer to a formal state system.
GB: Before going on to consider that system, can you tell me what costs there may be to your participants?
SD: There are no costs of using our system. The only costs that might be involved are where the solution to the dispute involves payment from one party to the other.
GB: One of the criticisms you have of the state system is that it is inefficient and takes far too long to get decisions in disputes. Is your system more efficient in that sense?
FV: Yes, our volunteers are aware of the need to resolve cases quickly, and they do so with few exceptions.
GB: Ok, can you now describe the other system you mentioned a moment ago?
FV: There the local party has re-organized the administration of the region which Kurds call Rojava. There is a Swiss style division into three cantons: Cizire or Komisto; Kobane; Efrin. In their municipal system they have Local Peace Commissions which handle the local affairs as if it was the “City Council and the City Courts”. In their alternative justice system, there are a number of levels at which they resolve disputes. At the lower level they deal with minor matters. Both civil and criminal.
At the next level there are more serious matters to deal with.
At this level, they have decided to use panels of a minimum of 1 or 2 up to a maximum of 9 persons; it is required that women be included, up to 5 maximum.
At the third level, they have an Appeal “court” with 12 members maximum.
In this system prosecution of crimes is open to any citizen, and any party is entitled to have a “friend” with them, who may be a lawyer, but does not have to be.
In the Kanton of Kobanyi there have been 700 cases closed with agreement. In a second district 900 cases closed with agreement.
SD: We can say there are many thousands of Kurds involved in this project to build an alternative justice system. In order to assess the diverse alternative systems which are emerging and developing across our region, just two weeks ago we organized a meeting of legal workers in Kurdistan and about 250 attended. A Permanent Council was established with representatives of different groups, e.g. Party, Women, Municipal workers. The idea is that all involved in this broad and diverse movement should be on the same general track.
GB: Can you say something about the role of women in Kurdish life and the struggle you are engaged in?
FV: Women are important in our struggle. They have taken a leading role. And we have our female martyrs. For example, you may know of the three women, outstanding comrades, who were assassinated not long ago in Paris. In our party women are given equal recognition and we have a system of quotas in elections and filling of offices, by which we will ensure that the historic bias against women, common in Middle Eastern cultures, is rectified.
GB: Can you tell me something about the nature of legal education in Turkey?
FV: It is basically conservative, traditional European. As you may not know, our law is almost entirely European. Our Penal Code came from Italy; our civil code is based on that of Switzerland; and our Constitution of 1982 was taken from the French. The Theoretical Foundation of our Party will develop ideas to assist in the long term development of the new system. In the short term it will also bring pressure on the state to change the unsatisfactory conditions which our people, and others, are forced to endure.
GB: I have written a paper concerning Local Peoples’ Tribunals which I hope will be considered by your people. It seeks to add a further dimension to alternatives to state institutions. As we say in the title-to bring the state, and corporations, to justice for the human rights and environmental abuses to which the mass of people are constantly subjected.
FV: We will have it translated and give it due consideration. We are looking for ideas as to how we can further develop the alternative justice system.
GB: I would recommend that you consider contacting the International Association of Peoples’ Lawyers. Although it may seem strange to recommend a lawyers’ organization, it is a progressive group of lawyers many of whom would have long experience of opposing the state, its law and its courts, as well as working with alternative structures. Their branch in the Philippines, their National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers has an excellent record of working to protect those alleged to be members of the New Peoples’ Army and/or the Communist Party of the Philippines, trade unionists, peasants and fisherfolk, environmental activists and others who are continually abused and harassed by state forces, paramilitaries and Multi-National Corporations. They would also know how the NPA operates its legal system in areas they control.
The IAPL is based in Brussels. I am confident that should you wish to seek ideas or assistance from them they would endeavour to help.
The IAPL produces a journal, DISSENT, in which they published several articles on human rights violations in Turkey: the mass trial (KCK) in Diyarbakir, and the arrests and imprisonment of about 50 Turkish and Kurdish lawyers, who are known human rights defenders. (Published in July, 2012) Dundar Gurses, a Kurd in exile in Netherlands, is one of the editors of that journal (and a member of the IAPL Board of Directors).
The International Association of Democratic Lawyers is bigger and much older. Headquartered also in Brussels, it will be holding an international conference in April (which many from IAPL and NUPL will be attending). It would be a good opportunity to develop links and exchange ideas, while also gaining recognition of the work you are doing here on alternative justice
FV: We will certainly consider what you have told us about the IAPL and the IADL. There is certainly a need to reach out to such groups.
GB: I would like to invite you both to co-operate with me in co-authoring a paper on the work you are doing, for presentation at the IAPL meeting in Brazil in February 2014, and possibly in a revised version to the IADL conference in Brussels. I hope to be able to visit the autonomous region of Chiapis, Mexico in connection with my trip to Brazil. What I learn about their justice system could be included in the revised paper.
SD: We would be happy to accept your invitation and work with you on this project. Brazil is probably too far away, but we are hopeful that we can have a representative go to Brussels for the IADL conference in April.
Examples of the work of the Legal Commissions and its evolution from both FV and SD
MAHMOUD CAMP CASE
The case involved a murder which occurred in the early stages of the system we are developing. A boy who lived in the camp with his family, was killed. He was the only son and the family was greatly upset. The facts were not in dispute. Everyone knew who had killed the boy.
The issue was one involving the values and philosophy that the Party wanted to develop in the new system it was developing. On one hand, the family wanted the perpetrator executed -“eye for an eye” punitive justice. At that time there was a death penalty for murder under the Turkish penal code.
On the other hand, the Party took a different view. It was trying to develop a whole new, alternative approach, including the sanctions appropriate to a system seeking what we might call holistic justice. Such sanctions would try to bring something positive out of the tragic events. Positive for the perpetrator, but also for the community. So it engaged in a process of discussion, education really, with the family of the victim.
After a time there was an agreement. The family accepted a “sentence” of life in detention. It would be supervised by the PKK.
In time, the perpetrator – a young man – was allowed some parole on the outside; and later he was allowed out of the prison to do public community service.
After about twenty years we established Councils of the People.
These Councils review the cases to see that they have been dealt with properly and adequately. They also operate as an appeal panel we have introduced where the perpetrator is not satisfied that s/he has been treated justly.
The State is Forced to Acknowledge Our System
A second case illustrates the way in which even the state, and the media, perceive the role of the alternative justice system. This case also involved a murder. This time the perpetrators ran away from the place where the killing took place. They attempted to hide in the major city of Diyarbakir.
The family of the victim found them, and killed one of the killers’ relatives, a child. The matter was supposed to go to the Peoples’ Commission (as it was known then). The police arrested the members of the Commission! They said it was a PKK institution, a “terrorist” organisation.
Then the violence between the two families erupted again, whereas things were quiet while it was in the hands of the Commission. There were more killings, and the media gave a lot of coverage to the problem. As a result of negative opinion in the media and the wider community, the Judge in the case decided to release the Commission members so that the matter could be settled informally by our methods, and the violence brought to an end.
Gill H. Boehringer
Banner image: Suruc, Turkey – October 20, 2014. Kurdish refugee children from Kobani, swing from an electricity power column, outside a refugee camp at the Turkish town of Suruc, near the Turkish – Syrian border. Photo: Giannis Papanikos, Shutterstock
- The basic aim of the LPTs project is to develop community level participatory, alternative, decentralized and de-professionalized institutions for exposing, publicizing and mobilizing opinion against local state and /or corporate abuses of human and environmental rights. Further, LPTs are intended to be one element in an evolving policy and practice of socialist transformation.
